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WHAT  IS IT? 
A Federation is a political union of several States, by which effect 
is given to a certain state or stage of political thought and feeling. If 
the people of the several States desire to become one nation and one 
people so far as foreign countries are concerned, and so far as certain 
specified subject matters which cannot be efficiently dealt with by the 
several States acting separately, but wish to preserve their autonomy 
and power of self-government in all other matters, they form a Fede-
ration. The difference between union and unity is fundamental. 
Two forms of union lie on either side of Federation—" unification " and 
"confederation"—between which it is the happy mean, and to 
properly understand what is meant by Federation, it is essential to 
clearly understand the difference between these three forms of govern-
ment. There are three fundamental elements which are essential 
to a true Federation. The first is—that between the Central or 
Federal Government and the different States' Governments there 
must be a division of powers, certain powers being delegated to the 
Federal Central Government, and certain other powers to the pro-
vincial Governments. The second is—There must be a dual citizen-
ship. In a Federation the people are citizens of two different nationa-
lities, if I may so express myself. They are citizens of the States and 
also of the Federation. Both the States and the Federal Governments 
act directly on them. In the particular form of union, which in con-
tradistinction to Federation is called Confederation, the Government 
of the central body acts upon the States as States, and not upon the 
individual citizens of the States as citizens of the Central Government. 
This fundamental distinction between Federation and Confedera-
tion is of the utmost importance, and should always be borne in mind. 
A Federal Government acts upon its citizen as such, and in a Federa-
tion the various States Governments act in the same manner 
on their citizens. Each citizen owes a double allegiance—an allegiance 
in reference to all matters in which power is given to the 
Central Government to that Government, and an allegiance in respect 
to all matters in which power is given to the  States'   Government to 
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that Government. It follows from this dual citizenship that the 
citizens in such a form of government have dual powers—the power of 
electing representatives as citizens of the Federation to the Federal 
Government, and also as citizens of the States the power of electing 
representatives to the States' Governments. Dual rights—the respec-
tive right of expressing and giving effect through those representatives 
to their desires and wishes on all political and executive questions 
which have been placed under the respective control of the Federal 
and States' Governments ; and dual duties—the duty of obeying the 
laws of the two forms of Government under which they live. The 
third fundamental element, which I venture to define as of the very 
essence of Federation, is this : The Federal Government is not formal 
or elected as it would be if the Federated States were one concrete 
nation. As citizens of the Federation, the people of the Federated 
States acting as one nation, elect one branch of the Legislature (the 
House of Representatives) on a numerical basis, in the same manner as 
the House of Parliament in these colonies are now elected. This 
branch is the numerical or concrete Nationality House, but they elect 
the other (the Senate) either directly or indirectly (through their States 
Legislature or by Electoral Colleges, &c.) as citizens of the States, 
each State, no matter what its population is, electing an equal number 
of Senators. This branch is the States' House. The one House 
represents the whole people grouped in constituencies, approximately 
numerically equal, and represents the National element. The other 
House represents the whole people grouped in States, and represents 
the States element. Take away or weaken the National element—the 
House of Representatives—and you have a union which tends towards 
and would ultimately end in Confederation. Take away or weaken 
the States element—the Senate—and you have a union which tends 
towards and would ultimately end in Unification. It is by combining 
these two elements, and by giving due power and authority to each, 
that you obtain the desideratum—Federation. 
By this means effect is given 10 the voice of the people of the 
whole Federal Commonwealth regarded as an undivided people, and 
the separate individuality of the several component States receive 
effective recognition. . The Federal Government can pass no law which 
does not receive the sanction of the majority of the people, and of the 
majority of the States. As the number of members elected to the 
House of Representatives by each State is in proportion to its popula-
tion, either Victoria or New South Wales could in that House outvote 
all the smaller colonies, and it is therefore essential to us that the 
States Council (the Senate) should be given at least equal powers with 
the numerical House. In America many powers are given to the 
Senate which are not conferred upon the other House. It is the 
stronger House, and the States have preserved their power of local self-
government intact. If the smaller colonies do not wish to become 
provinces of Victoria and New South Wales, the Senate must be 
made strong and powerful. Benjamin Franklin, in speaking of the 
American Constitution, wrote :— 
"Too much provision cannot be made against a consolidation. 
The State Governments represent the wishes, the feelings, and local 
interests of the people. They are the safeguards and ornament of the 
Constitution. They will protract the period of our liberties ; they will 
afford shelter against the  abuse of power,  and will be the natural 
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avengers of our violated rights. This article " (that is the article pro-
viding for a strong Senate in which each State was equally repre-
sented) "secures the excellence of the Constitution, and affords just 
ground to believe that it will be in practice what it is in theory, a 
Federal Republic." 
A Senate with at least co-equal power to the House of Represen-
tatives is the quintessence of the Federal form of Government; it holds 
the balance between the National and the States Governments, and is 
the characteristic Federal pivot on which the whole system revolves. 
ITS   ADVANTAGES. 
As most public speakers have in the main dwelt upon the patriotic 
and sentimental advantages of Federation, it is intended (whilst not 
only admitting, but even insisting upon the great importance of this 
aspect of the question) to enumerate only the material and practical 
advantages which will accrue to these colonies if a true Federation 
is formed. 
1. History and experience have shown that neighbouring States 
in course of time either drift into open enmity with each other— 
actual war, alternating with armed preparation for war—or form 
Federations. Intermediate forms of union, treaties, leagues, alliances, 
confederations have all proved failures. Federation has been shown 
to be not only a means, but the only political means by which lasting 
Unions can be formed. It is true that even Federation does not 
always prevent dissension or even actual war between the constituent 
States, but all human institutions are imperfect, and in the only case 
in which actual war has happened in a Federation — the war between 
North and South in America—the question of slavery, which led to the 
war, festered for eighty years before it broke out, and was one of 
those questions which might well—as in fact it nearly did—prevent 
the existence of a Federal Republic. Mr. Freeman wrote in 1862, 
when this war was at its height:—"If the system has broken down 
at last we may be sure that any other system would have broken down 
sooner." But although Mr. Freeman was 110 doubt justified by the 
outlook at the time he wrote, the system did not break down; the 
Federation of North America is as firmly knit together as ever, and 
no more conclusive and triumphant vindication of the system could 
be given than the fact that it remains unimpaired and stronger than 
ever after so severe a shock as that great war. The more populous 
these colonies become the more questions leading to friction and 
disputes between them will arise. Republics are notoriously quarrel-
some, and all history and experience have shown that no ties, not 
even those of a common origin, speech and religion will in the end 
prevail against self-interest. The most bloody and vindictive wars 
have been waged between kinsmen. 
Does any one suppose that had the States of North America not 
federated they would have lived  (except in   one  single case  before 
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referred to) at peace for over one hundred years with each other ? If 
he does, let him look at South America, where during the same period 
neighboring republics, in which the dominant races are of the same 
nationality, blood, speech, and religion, have been chronically at war 
with each other. Let him look at Switzerland, where, notwith-
standing that for hundreds of years the cantons have been joined 
together by leagues, alliances, and confederations, they were more 
often at war with each other than with foreign nations—until 1848, 
when for the first time they " federated."—No doubt this advantage 
is prospective, and the shallow and untenable argument has been used 
that it is time enough to meet these dangers when the necessity arises. 
It might just as well be argued that you should not insure your house 
until after it had caught fire. When dissensions have arisen, end 
animosities have been aroused, the formation of a Federation will be 
impossible. In shaping the destinies of a nation, we must consider 
the future as well as the present, and give due consideration to the 
instincts and probable actions of men in the future as illustrated by 
the past. 
This is not all. Apart from the horrors of war, there is the ques-
tion of expense. 
Contrast the Continent of Europe and that of North America. On 
the one hand we find each nation armed to the teeth, some eight or ten 
millions of men trained to cut one another's throats, costing the tax-
payers some one or two hundred millions per annum ; on the other 
we find a handful of soldiers acting almost entirely as a Federal police, 
and military and naval expenditure reduced to a minimum. 
When Australian Federation is accomplished, there will he for 
the first time in the history of the world, a continent for a nation and a 
nation for a continent, freed from any prospect of internecine war, 
and consequently released from any necessity for enormous expendi-
ture for defence purposes against neighboring states. 
2. We have already begun  to develop germs of a foreign policy, 
and have interfered, or attempted to do so, with the French in re 
ference  to New Caledonia,  with the Germans in reference to New 
Guinea,  and with the Chinese and Japanese in reference to colored 
immigration.    No doubt, as we become more populous and important, 
we will also become more self-assertive and prepared to vindicate our 
rights and interests ; gradually but surely the  Islands of the Pacific 
will come under the domination of some of  the great powers of the 
world, and indications are not wanting that that power will be Aus 
tralia.   Norfolk Island has lately been handed  over to New South 
Wales, and Queensland has practically annexed part of New Guinea. 
We must be in a position to defend ourselves against foreign invasion, 
and to insure that our rights and interests  outside  of our own  con 
tinent shall be respected.     The advantage   both as to economy and 
efficiency of a Federal force (both military and naval) as against six in 
dependent State forces are so apparent and obvious as to need no 
supporting argument. 
3, The public debts of these colonies amount to something like 
£180,000,000.    If the greater portion of this debt is taken over by 
the Federal Government, and paid off as the bonds fall due by the 
proceeds   of   Federal   loans, I   see no reason why something like 
£1,000,000 per annum should not be ultimately saved in interest.    The 
credit of Federated Australia should be as good as the credit of any other 
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country in the world. British 2f Consols are quoted at £112. The 
Australian Colonies, on an average, have borrowed at £3 18s. 9d. per 
cent., and after giving due allowance to the present glut of money, 
there appears to be a margin which would amount to probably 
£1,000,000 per annum, if all the States' debts were taken over. 
In fairness, an adjustment would have to be made, but this 
will not materially affect the annual saving of interest. When Canada 
federated it was agreed that the debts of the provinces up to a specific 
amount per head of the respective populations should be taken over by 
the Federation, and it would probably be a fair adjustment for the 
Federation to first take over from each colony a sufficient amount of 
their respective debts to pay for the post office, telegraph, and other 
public works taken over by the Federal Government, and then a 
further amount based on equitable lines to be arrived at after investi-
gation. No doubt a considerable portion of this saving is prospective, 
but it is a saving which would increase year by year. 
4. The benefits and advantages which  will accrue from Inter 
colonial Free Trade are so generally recognised and admitted, that it is 
not necessary to dwell on this head.    The total revenue raised by the 
six colonies   from Customs    and   excise   amounted,  in   1895-6   to 
£7,151,855.    The total duties levied by the colonies on the produc 
tions of the other colonies was estimated by the  New South  Wales 
officials    for    1891   as    £529,410,     and    for    1891    as    £733,000. 
Intercolonial Free Trade  will, however, undoubtedly diminish  the 
£7,151,855, but not to any great degree, and as against this loss there 
would be the large saving on the cost of collection consequent on the 
abolition of Border duties. 
There are some people who suggest that we can have Intercolonial 
Freetrade without Federation ; they must he very sanguine and un-
practical. Ever since 1873, when the Imperial Parliament first author-
ised the colonies to levy intercolonial preferential customs duties, 
attempts have been made by the various colonies to enter into customs 
treaties with each other, &c , &c, all of which have ended in entire 
and dismal failure, although they were confined to a few articles of 
colonial production. 
5. There is considerable difference of opinion as to the necessity 
for the various Acts passed in the different colonies restricting or pro 
hibiting coloured races from  entering  or  settling in Australia, but 
all will unite in agreeing that any such large influx of alien races, as 
would change the characteristics of the Australian people and create a 
nation of half-castes, ought to be prevented.    This matter, which may 
cause disputes and perhaps war with foreign countries, can be 
effectally dealt with only by Federated Australia. 
6. The jurisdiction of each colony only extends for three miles be 
yond high-water mark. Federated Australia should have jurisdiction and 
control of fisheries and other matters outside  that line.    Pearl-fishing 
in Northern Australia is an important industry,   and we have already 
come into conflict with the subjects of foreign powers on this question. 
7. At  present  an alien naturalised in any one colony becomes a 
British subject in that colony only, and continues an alien in all the 
other colonies.    If naturalised by a Federal Government, he would 
become a British subject for all Australia.       These colonies  cannot 
legislate for  each   other;   the  only authority which  can  legislate  
for all the colonies is the British Parliament.    We have been granted 
powers of 
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local self-government; let us exercise these powers to the fullest 
extent by constituting an Australian authority which so far, as regards 
this and other matters of a similar nature,  can deal with Australia as 
a whole. 
8. Greater economy and efficiency would be insured in the man 
agement of the postal and telegraph departments, no doubt ultimately 
resulting in a penny postage and a sixpenny telegram. 
9.The Northern Territory is a white elephant to South Australia, 
costing £60,000 per annum, over  and above  receipts.    There seems 
no prospect of getting rid of this enormous annual drain unless by 
Federation.    The principle has been established by legislation, that in 
the interests of Australia as a whole, no colored labor shall be 
employed in the Northern Territory. Without suitable labor to 
develop its resources, this Territory must continue unpopulated and 
unremunerative, but it is only fair that United Australia should 
make good the loss incurred in the interests of all Australia. 
10. An economical and efficient system of quarantine would be 
established.    This  cannot  be  done at present, because there is no 
authority (except the British Parliament), who has any power to deal 
with the  matter as a whole.    We have at present six expensive and 
inefficient systems, which do not fit in or work with each other. 
11. The remarks in paragraph 10 apply also to lighthouses, except 
that the coasts of Australia are, as a rule,  well lit and the systems 
efficient; but when any colony, from any cause whatever, is unwilling 
or unable to erect a lighthouse on any given spot on its own territory, 
that spot must remain unlit, although a lighthouse there may  be  of 
the utmost importance  to the rest of Australia.    A lighthouse has 
only just been erected on perhaps the most important spot in Aus 
tralia—the Leuwin. 
12. An author, inventor, or tradesman would only require to take 
out one copyright, patent, or trade-mark, as the case might be, for the 
whole of Australia.    At present he has to take out six.    Each patent 
costs about six or seven guineas. 
13. The influx  of  foreign criminals could be more   effectually 
prevented. 
14. Judgments obtained in any one colony would be effective all 
over Australia.    They are so at present in theory, but the Acts of the 
various colonies which purport to render them so are so imbued with 
the spirit that it is necessary to protect their own citizens against the 
citizens of other colonies as to render the theory little more than a theory. 
15. The laws relating to the important questions of Banking and 
Insolvency would be efficiently dealt with, and the laws relating to 
marriage and divorce would be made uniform. 
16. The navigation of and irrigation from rivers and the riparian 
rights of States and individuals would be legislated for.    The question 
concerning the water of  the River Murray,   which  arose between 
South Australia and New South Wales some time ago, has never been 
settled, and is bound to arise again in a more aggravated form as 
more and more water is used for irrigation on the head waters of the 
Murray and its tributaries.    In the absence of Federation, there is no 
authority to settle this or any similar question, and both it and the 
ever-recurring dispute between   South Australia   and  Victoria   are 
examples of questions which give rise to friction and dispute,  and 
sometimes ultimately end in animosity, and even war. 
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17. A strong Central Government would ensure domestic tran-
quility, and outrages, which have in some cases, amounted to almost 
civil war, would be put down by a strong hand. In the past, local 
Ministries have sometimes been afraid to perform the first and 
paramount duty of every Government—" the preservation of law and 
order." 
ITS  DISADVANTAGES. 
There is so human scheme to which objections cannot be raised, 
and to which there are not some disadvantages. The disadvantages 
of Federation are few, and most of them are of little importance. 
1. The question  of  cost has  been put forward as one of the 
greatest of its disadvantages, but I do not see why the economy of one 
administration as against six administrations in the management of 
the Customs, Post Office, Telegraph, and other Public Services, which 
will be taken over by the  Federal Government, and the saving in 
interest on the public debt, should net pay, and more than pay, for 
the cost of the Federal Government, and if the ultimate saving in 
military and naval matters is considered, Federation, instead of being 
an expense, would ultimately be the means of an enormous reduction 
in taxation.    As a  separate  article  will be written on the cost of 
Federation, it is not necessary to now give figures and details. 
2. The Local Parliaments will be shorn of some of their prestige, 
and the power to legislate concerning certain subject matters will be 
taken from them.    This loss of prestige does not appear to be of great 
importance to the people.    And if (as has been  shown) the  Federal 
Parliament can more   efficiently  legislate  concerning these  subjects, 
and if (as it is without doubt) they can be more efficiently and econo 
mically managed by the Federal government so far as efficiency and 
economy are concerned, this will be of advantage, not of disadvantage, 
to the people of all the States. 
3. It   has   been  alleged  that  the   establishment   of   a   Federal 
Government will be an injury to the present capitals, such as Adelaide, 
Melbourne, &c.    This may happen to a slight degree, but it has not 
happened in Canada, America, or Switzerland.    If the true principles 
of Federation are embodied in the Australian Federal scheme,  the 
Federal capital cannot be the capital of one of the constituent States, 
but must be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Govern 
ment.     It is not contended that this is an absolute essential  of 
Federation, but it is not probable that these colonies will  enter into a 
Federation in   which the Central Government will have  to rely on 
one of the States Governments for its safety and for the enforcement 
of its laws in its own seat of government, and in which the capital of 
one State will secure predominance over the capitals of all the other 
States, 
4. The Customs tariff for South Australia, instead of being made 
by the people of  South  Australia for themselves, will be made by a 
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Parliament in which they are represented, but over which they have 
no controlling power. This can be looked at from three points of 
view—Revenue, Free Trade, Protection. 
So far as revenue is concerned—as the revenue will no longer be 
part of the revenue of this colony—this does not seem to be of much 
importance from a local point of view. 
As all the colonies except New South Wales are still wedded to 
protection, the strong probability is that the Federal tariff for some 
time to come, at all events, will be of a protective nature. Those who 
are Protectionists should rejoice at this, and those who are Freetraders 
should rejoice that the area over which freetrade reigns triumphant 
will become enlarged by Intercolonial freetrade. 
The only class who have some cause for alarm are the local 
manufacturers, who may dread the competition of the large cities— 
Melbourne and Sydney. Some years ago a South Australian Com-
mission was appointed to collect their evidence, and in nearly all cases 
'they stated that they were quite prepared to face such competition, 
and confident that they could hold their own. 
5. Control over all the subject matters which are entrusted to the 
Federal Government will be taken from the Local Parliaments. If 
(as undoubtedly will be the case) these subject matters can be more 
effectually and economically dealt with by the Federal Government, 
this is not a disadvantage, even from the democratic point of view, 
unless so far as it conflicts with the democratic axiom—"Government 
for the people, by the people, in sight of the people." 
There is no doubt that in the minds of a large number of the people 
this loss of power by the local Parliaments, solely elected and constituted 
by themselves, grouped in their own particular State—this feeling that 
local self-government is to a certain extent being given up—is a 
disadvantage, and has prevented Federation from being an existing 
fact years ago. All those who are of opinion that everything that is 
wrong, and who, with a confidence born of their own good intentions, 
and sustained by scorn of the lessons of history and experience, 
imagine they can by legislation set everything right, and who believe 
that what they call reforms will be retarded by a central organisation ; 
all those who, either by force of numbers, or by acting in a body on 
either side, as their interests appear to demand, have become the domi-
nant political power in some or all of the colonies, and who naturally say 
to themselves: "We can control our own legislation, but can we control 
legislation in the new authority which is to be erected;" ministers 
of the Crown and others holding high political positions, who fear the 
loss of power and prestige, may all reasonably be expected to be either 
lukewarm in favor of Federation, or not to desire its immediate con-
summation. None say openly and publicly that they are antagonistic, 
but many privately express a vague dislike to the system. They 
cannot, or will not, formulate their reasons, but seek to kill the move-
ment by delay, or by the imposition of impossible conditions which 
they know will not be agreed to. 
But let anyone holding any of these views or opinions examine 
for himself the powers proposed to be entrusted to the Federal 
Government, and he will see that very few of such powers are of any 
importance, from either a Democratic, Socialistic, or Radical point of 
view. From any one of these aspects it cannot matter whether a 
Federal or   a   Local  Government controls lighthouses, quarantine, 
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influx of criminals, collection of census, and statistics, &c, &c, and 
investigation will prove that the only matters of any social importance 
which the Local Parliaments will be prohibited dealing with will be : —
(a) Customs tariff and excise; (b) Naval and military affairs ; (c) 
Alien and colored races. 
From the considerations already advanced concerning these 
subject matters it will be seen that it is probable that, so far as a and 
c are concerned, the Federal Parliament will be in accord with the 
views of the Protectionists and the Labor Societies, and that so far as 
b is concerned there is not room for difference of opinion. 
6. It has been hinted that with two Governments, with con-
current and unlimited powers of taxation—in some instances including 
the same methods of raising revenue—difficulties would arise as to the 
framing of local budgets and schemes of taxation. This is an 
imaginary objection. No such difficulties have arisen in other 
Federations, and no such difficulties would ever arise except in the 
case of war expenditure against a foreign enemy, and then much 
greater difficulties would arise if there were no Federation. The 
Customs, Post and Telegraph Offices, &c, revenue for the six 
colonies would not be subject to such great variation as similar 
revenue for any one of the constituent States, and local treasurers 
would have less difficulty in estimating the amount of Federal revenue 
and expenditure than they would have in estimating their own. 
In conclusion, it will be seen how few and unimportant are the 
practical disadvantages of Federation from whatever political aspect it is 
considered. 
THE   DISADVANTAGE   OF   ANY 
OTHER   FORM   OF   UNION. 
A Confederation is that form of union in which the Central 
Government acts directly on or through the States of which the union 
is composed, and only indirectly on the citizens of such States. It 
may legislate for, but cannot directly act upon the individual. In it there 
is only one citizenship and one allegiance—the citizen is a citizen of the 
State, not of the Confederation. He has no voice (except indirectly as an 
elector of his own State) in the formation of the Union Government; 
that Government may or may not have an executive to enforce and a 
judiciary to interpret its laws ; but even if they exist, they are both 
powerless, because the Government of which they form part relies 
(and often relies in vain) on the various States' Governments for its 
revenue, and for the enforcement of all its commands. As was 
written of the American Confederation of 1781 (the proved in-
adequacy and effeteness of which led up to the American Federation) : 
—"It may make and conclude treaties, but it can only recommend 
the observance of them. It may appoint ambassadors, but cannot 
even defray the expenses of their tables. It may borrow in its own 
name, on the faith of the Union, but cannot repay a single dollar.    It 
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may coin money, but cannot import an ounce of bullion. It may make 
war, and declare what numbers of troops are necessary, but it cannot 
raise a single soldier. It can declare everything, but can do nothing." 
Under any form of union there must be points of contact, 
and consequently of possible friction, between the Union and 
the States' Governments. Time and evolution will inevitably 
raise questions in which the interests of the people of some one or 
more of the component States will be, or will appear to be, divergent 
from those of the remaining States. Any form of union to be lasting 
must reduce these points of contact, and the possibility of any such ques-
tions arising to a minimum. Federation does this— Confederation does 
exactly the contrary. This and its powerlessness to enforce its com-
mands, are its two radical defects. The one is vicious and injurious-; 
the other (unless for temporary and under exceptional circumstances: 
which, as in the American struggle for independence, coerced the 
States into obedience), deprives it of the right to even the name of 
"Government." Many Confederations have existed, and have con-
stituted an effective means of defence against a foreign foe, but as a 
beneficial form of union they have been temporary, and, the external 
pressure removed, they have become the mothers of war and strife 
between the component States, ending generally in total disrupture. 
In some cases (as in the case of Switzerland up to 1847), the outside 
pressure being again brought to bear, there has been a forced tem-
porary re-integration, but never a permanent, beneficial, and lasting 
union. 
Hamilton says in the FEDERALIST:—"A sovereignty over sove-
reigns, a Government over Governments, a Legislature for com-
munities as distinguished from individuals ; as it is a solecism in 
theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of political 
polity, by substituting violence in the place of law, or the destructive 
coercion of the sword in the place of the mild and salutary coercion of 
the magistracy." The necessity for laying bare the cancers of Con-
federation arises from the fact that Australia is already to a certain 
extent " confederated." "We have in our midst the (miscalled) Federal 
Council, which is to a certain extent a "confederated" form of 
Government (harmless only because of its powerlessness), which, after 
many years of existence, has been fruitful only of picnics for Premiers,. 
the piece de resistance of which, in the form of legislation, has been 
mainly confined to beche-de-mer. If, however, power had been given. 
to that body to extend its legislation beyond the confines of beche-de-
mer, and it had passed any law which appeared, perhaps even without 
due cause, to the people of any State to be unfair to them, and to, 
unduly favor the interests of some other State or States, would that 
law have been obeyed in the aggrieved State? Certainly not. The 
people, the local parliament, and the press would have united in 
decrying such a law, and the State authorities (the only authorities 
with any power to act), reflecting public opinion, would have allowed, 
it to remain a dead letter. Bitter feelings and jealousies would have 
been engendered, the "Federal spirit'' would have ceased to exist, 
and the recalcitrant State would either have been coerced by her sister 
States (which means civil war), or the "Federal Council laws" become a 
laughing stock. 
It may be argued that the same results would arise under Federa- 
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tion, but this is not so. Each citizen is a citizen of the Union 
Government; he has the same rights concerning, and takes the same 
part as any other citizen in, the election of members of both Houses 
of the Federal Government. Feeling that it is to a certain extent his 
Government that has passed the law for his nation, renders him 
not only unwilling to carp or criticize, but even blind to defects which 
may really exist. What rage, what outcries of tyranny, what revolu-
tions, would have been caused had outside powers enforced on the 
people of these respective colonies many of the laws which (because 
they are made by themselves) they live under not only with satisfac-
tion, but even with pride ? But above and beyond this, the Federal 
Government, by (through its own executive) enforcing its commands 
over its own citizens, ensures for itself not only obedience, but also 
respect ; the temporary irritation (which perhaps was never justified), 
passes away, and the union not only continues, but is perhaps even 
strengthened. These considerations are offered to those who think 
that a beneficial and lasting union between the Australian colonies can 
be brought about by enlarging the number of the members of, and ex-
tending the powers of the (miscalled) Federal Council. The old 
proverb about a silk purse is illustrative of the impossibility of doing 
this. It is a pity that the words "Federation" and "Conferation" 
have been so often used incorrectly. This is probably due to the fact 
that when the Southern American States separated from the North— 
although they paid the highest tribute that has ever been paid to any 
union form of Government by adopting almost verbatim the Federal 
Constitution of the hated and despised North — were obliged to adopt 
some distinctive name, and Confederation was the nearest in sound to 
Federation they could get. The so-called Confederated United States 
were a true Federation, and the so-called Federal Council of Australia 
is a hybrid closely allied to Confederation. All the considerations 
advanced in opposition to a Confederation apply with equal force to still 
looser forms of union, such as leagues, treaties, and alliances. There are 
many intermediary stages between a Federation and a Confederation, 
partaking partly of the one, and partly of the other, but the nearer we 
approximate to an undiluted Federation, the more beneficial and 
enduring our union will be. 
ITS  FINANCIAL  ASPECT. 
It is generally admitted that the Commonwealth Bill of the 
Sydney Convention, 1891, must be the basis for Australian Federation. 
Notwithstanding that hostile critics have for six years endeavored to 
find fault with that Bill, and notwithstanding that it has ran the 
gauntlet of nearly every Australian Parliament, no one has ventured 
to propound a new scheme. But I think that it is also generally 
admitted that the financial proposals it contains are incorrect in theory, 
and would have been disastrous in practise. 
Sir Samuel Griffiths, who was not only the draftsman of the Bill, 
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but was also the leading spirit in the Sydney Convention, has since 
written :—" The inequalities and unfairness which would result from 
schemes already put forward are, I think, so unjust as to require no 
comment. I am convinced that until the financial difficulty is fairly 
faced Federation, however much it may be talked about, and whatever 
constitutions are framed, will not actually be accomplished." 
The results which would have arisen had the Commonwealth Bill 
been in force in the year 1894 are shown by the following tables :— 
 
The surplus revenue of the Commonwealth would therefore have 
been £5,935,000, and if this had been distributed amongst the con-
stituted states in the manner proposed by the Commonwealth Bill, the 
result would have been that South Australia would have contributed 
to the cost of the Federal Government £28,000, New South Wales 
£9,000, Victoria £259,000, Tasmania £29,000, whilst Queensland 
would have actually gained £56,000, and West Australia £19,000. 
Comment to show the unfairness of such a proposal is needless. 
There is, however, another fundamental and vital error common to 
the Commonwealth and other schemes, involving the distribution of 
surplus revenue amongst the constituent States, which have been 
promulgated. 
The Federal Government would be in possession of a far larger 
revenue than it actually required—a state of things certain to result in 
extravagance an 1 ruinous expenditure ; and the States' Governments 
would have to rely for a large portion of their respective revenues on 
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the distribution of a probably annually decreasing fund over which 
they have no control. 
The Convention of 1897 will have to re-cast the finance of Federa-
tion, but inasmuch as it is absolutely essential that the Federal Govern-
ment should receive the customs and excise, and highly desirable that 
the post-offices and telegraphs should be managed as a whole, and that 
the revenue from these sources should also belong to the Federation, 
this annual surplus of £5,935,000 will have to be dealt with, and the 
question arises, What is to be done with it ? The answer to the ques-
tion was foreshadowed by a clause in the Commonwealth Bill itself, 
which gave power to the Federal Government, with the consent of the 
States, to take over and consolidate the public debt of any State or 
States. It is now generally admitted that the Federal Government 
shall (not may) take over so much of the debts of the constituent States 
as will, for payment of interest thereon, absorb the surplus revenue. 
Our debts amount in round numbers to about £181,000,000, 
borrowed at an average of £3 18s. 9d. per cent., so that it would 
appear as if the surplus revenue of the Federation would be sufficient 
to pay the interest on about £150,000. The effect, however, of inter-
colonial freetrade on the Federal customs duties, and consequently on 
the surplus revenue of the Federation, must not be overlooked, and 
will be considered later on. 
The following table shows the indebtedness of the colonies at per 
head of the respective populations (omitting shillings):— 
The Federation must, of course, become responsible for such an 
amount of the public debt of each of the colonies as will pay for the 
respective post offices, telegraph, forts, &c, which will be handed over 
to the Federal Government, and one of the matters which the Con-
vention of 1897 will probably closely investigate is how much more of 
such respective debts the Federation ought to assume. 
When Canada federated the Central Government, after becoming 
responsible for so much of the Provincial loans as were equivalent for 
the various public works taken over, became responsible for further 
amounts of such debts at a rate per head of the population of the re-
spective provinces. The average debt per head of the Australian 
colonies is about £51, but probably it would work unfairly if the 
rough and ready rule adopted in Canada was also adopted in Australia. 
This is a matter which requires investigation and consideration. No 
doubt the effect of intercolonial freetrade will diminish the surplus of 
£5,950,000, but not to such a great extent as might be supposed. Mr. 
Coghlan, the Government Statist of New South Wales,  estimated the 
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amount levied by colonies on the production of other colonies as 
£529,000 for 1891, and £733,000 for 1894. 
Of course, if the Federal Government does not collect these inter-
colonial duties, the citizens of the Commonwealth will not pay them, 
and if other duties are imposed to make up the loss of Customs revenue, 
arising from intercolonial Free Trade, it will not be additional taxa-
tion, but only an alteration of the incidence of taxation. 
After all, these considerations, and others of a like nature, are 
based on the amount produced by the tariffs of the various colonies as 
they are at present, and are, to a certain extent, speculative, because 
the actual results will arise from a tariff for Australia as a whole, 
which is yet to be settled by the representatives of the people of Aus-
tralia as a whole. 
It has been shown that the average rate of interest paid by these 
colonies on the bonds is £3 18s. 9d., and it must be admitted that 
when such bonds fall due from time to time the money could probably 
be borrowed by the respective colonies at lower rates of interest, but if 
bonds to the amount of, say, £150,000,000, are from time to time, as 
they fall due, repaid by the proceeds of loans borrowed by the Federa-
tion, there can be no doubt that an immense saving in interest will 
ultimately accrue. No matter what the state of the money market 
may be, the Federation will be probably enabled to borrow at from ½ 
per cent. to 1 per cent. lower rate of interest than any of the 
colonies. I do not believe in the immediate conversion of the State 
bonds into Federal bonds ; such a scheme is neither practicable nor 
economical; but by allowing the bonds, responsibility for which is 
taken over by the Federal Government, to mature, and by issuing 
Federal bonds to raise the funds to pay the matured State bonds, 
there will be an ultimate saving, amounting to, perhaps, £1,000,000 
per annum. It has been suggested that if the Federal Government 
take over the State debts, it should also take over the works on which 
the bulk of the borrowed money has been expended—the railways. I 
confess I do not see why this should be. In 1891, as a member of the 
Sydney Convention, I supported this contention, but at that time I 
did not fully appreciate what a great and fundamental mistake it is to 
grant to any Government an enormous surplus revenue. This is what 
would occur if the whole of the railways were handed over to the 
Central Government. Let us not repeat the financial mistakes of the 
Commonwealth Bill. 
No doubt the imposition of differential railway tariffs by one 
colony to divert the trade and commerce of another colony is contrary 
to the spirit of Federation, but I think that the provisions of the 
German Federation will meet this difficulty. Articles 41 to 47, in 
effect provide that "all new lines are to be constructed and equipped 
according to an uniform plan," "uniform regulations are to be intro-
duced," " and differential tariffs, intending to unfairly divert trade and 
commerce from one State to another are to be abolished." The Swiss 
Federation also, to a certain extent, controls without owning her rail-
ways. Very few of our railways can be said to be lines of Australian 
national importance, and if the elements of locality are utterly 
eliminated from the management of our local railways dissatisfaction 
would ensue. 
The conclusion arrived at is : That in its initiation, and for some 
time to come, Federation will involve a very small addition to the cost 
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of the Government of Australia ; that in the near future the economies 
to arise from one administration, instead of six administrations in 
various large public departments, and (if the arrangement advocated 
as to one public debt is adopted) the saving of interest will not only 
reduce such cost to nil, but will result in an actual saving to the tax-
payers, and that by abrogating the necessity for the protection of the 
various colonies against each other an enormous relief from taxation 
will accrue later on. 
 
DISPUTED   POINTS. 
Except as to finance and railways, which have already been dis-
cussed, there are few points on which the basis of any Australian 
Federation scheme (the Commonwealth Bill) has been seriously 
challenged ; these are :— 
(a) The mode of election of the Senate. 
(b) The constitution of the House of Representatives. 
(c) The powers of the Senate. 
(d) The constitution of the Executive. 
a and b include the question of the franchise of electors. (a) There 
are three possible methods by which our Senate can be elected : By 
the Legislation of the constituent States, as in America, and as is 
proposed by the Commonwealth Bill ; by the various constituent 
States in such manner as they may respectively decide, as in Switzer-
land and in Germany ; or directly by the people of the States. This 
last method is not in force anywhere. Either of these three (3) 
methods is consistent with a true Federation. The second is the most 
logical, because the members of the Senate represent the States as 
States, and it may be contended that to dictate to the States the 
method by which they shall appoint those who represent them is to 
unnecessarily interfere in their domestic concerns. The first is in the 
interests of the smaller States, such as South Australia, the most 
desirable because, above all things, it is essential to the smaller States 
that the Senate should be as powerful, if not more powerful, than the 
House of Representatives. The third is impracticable and objec-
tionable. 
It must always be borne in mind that the election of members to 
any legislature is only a means to an end, the end being to secure the 
election of the strongest and best men who can most fully and effec-
tually represent the views of their constituents. There are some who 
are apt to exalt the means above the end, or who, in their anxiety to 
deify democracy, lose sight of the end altogether. The idea which has 
been so vehemently enunciated, that we ought not to Federate until 
all the colonies adopt the franchise in force for the South Australian 
House of Assembly, so far as election to the Federal Parliament is 
concerned, is somewhat arrogant, and if insisted upon, must be a bar 
to any Federation. If the idea were agreed to, the other colonies 
would be obliged to either adopt the South Australian franchise for 
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their own domestic elections, or have two concurrent and different 
electoral systems. It is not probable that they will do either of these 
things, and the idea itself is contrary to the spirit of Federation, 
which demands that as little interference as is possible shall take place 
in the domestic concerns of the constitutional States. If we desire to 
present a theoretical Federation from becoming a practical consolida-
tion, we must never lose sight of the end desired—a strong and 
powerful guardian of the rights of the smaller States. 
We must recollect that no matter what words are used in framing 
our Federal Constitution, the forces behind will warp and alter its 
practical working written, and therefore supposed inelastic, constitutions 
by time and evolution become different from the conceptions of their 
author.    An American writer, Mr. Woodrow Wilson, says:— 
"There has been a constant growth of legislative and adrminis-
tive practice, and a steady accretion of precedent in the 
management of federal affairs, which have broadened the 
sphere and altered the functions of the Government without 
perceptibly affecting the vocabulary of our constitutional 
language. Ours is scarcely less than the British, a living 
and fecund system." 
If the Senators were elected by the Parliament, the State, as 
it ought to be, would be their constituent, and they would look for 
guidance and assistance to their immediate electors, whose opinions 
and arguments easily and quickly expressed in Parliament would help 
and sustain their representatives. Our own experience, when the 
whole of South Australia was one constituency for the Legislative 
Council, has shown the evils of large constituents scattered over 
immense areas. Such electorates do not and cannot know their repre-
sentative, or hear his views, they are slow to move, and difficult to 
educate up to any idea, they become apathetic, and mere money 
decides elections. 
It is a significant fact that in all the federations which are in 
existence the same method of election of members to the House of 
Representatives exists. In America, Canada, Switzerland, and 
Germany the people of the federated constituent States are all 
considered as one nation for the purpose of choosing electors for the 
House of Representatives, and in all cases the various States are 
represented in accordance with their numbers. In the Commonwealth 
Bill it is proposed that each 30,000 electors for the numerical House 
should be entitled to choose one representative, and it is also proposed 
that the franchise for the Lower House of each colony shall be the 
franchise for the election in that colony of members of the Federal 
House of Representatives. It is difficult to see how this proposed 
system can be logically or conveniently departed from. It is true 
that the smaller colonies will, so far as the House of Representatives 
is concerned, be swamped and submerged by the larger number of 
members which the two large colonies of Victoria and New South 
Wales will be entitled to, but if a strong and powerful Senate is in-
sisted upon, it is submitted that the rights of the smaller colonies will 
be safeguarded. So law can be passed without the concurrence of 
both Houses, and the small States must always look to the Senate as 
their House. Those who, while advocating Federation, seek to 
impose impossible conditions, are no friends to Federation, and the 
claim that all the other colonies should abandon their own franchise, 
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and adopt the franchise of South Australia, is just as one-sided and 
impracticable as if Victoria were to insist on all the other colonies, 
South Australia included, adopting plural voting, as a condition prece-
dent to federation. 
As has been frequently before remarked, the Senate should be at 
least as powerful as the House of Representatives. In America the 
Senate has almost co-equal powers of legislation. Practically its con-
sent is necessary to the appointment of all those we should call the 
Ministry. It alone has the power to make treaties and appoint 
ambassadors. In Germany the Bundesrath is a more powerful House 
than the Reichstag. It can initiate any Bill, and it has the final say 
in all legislation, no matter where initiated or where altered. Even 
if the Bill is introduced in the Bundesrath, and is passed in the 
Reichstag without any alteration, it has again to be brought before the 
Bundesrath for final ratification. The consent of the Chief Executive 
officer, the Emperor of Germany, is not necessary to the passing of 
any Bill. The Bundesrath, in addition to being a House of Legis-
lature, occupies, so far as legislation is concerned, the position of the 
Crown in England. Some of those whom we should call the Ministry 
are committees of that House, and some other members perform im-
portant Ministerial functions in consequence of representing specified 
States ; in all respects it is the most powerful House. The Swiss 
Council of the States is at least as powerful as the other House. 
We can obtain no assistance from the consideration of the 
Constitution of the Dominion of Canada, because there the Senate 
is nominated; as a matter of fact for this and some other reasons, 
Canada can hardly be said to be a true Federation. Mr. Goldwin 
Smith "wonders how the bare-faced proposal that the leader 
of the dominant party should have the uncontrolled appoint-
ment of the members of one branch of the Legislature could ever 
have been acceded to." Ever since the Dominion came into existence 
there has been friction between the Central and Provincial Govern-
ments, and signs are not wanting that the Dominion of Canada will end 
either in consolidation or a disruption of the constituent States. 
It is wonderful how little notice has been taken by anyone except 
by Sir Frederick Griffiths and myself, of the relationship which ought 
to exist between the two Houses of Parliament, and the Executive in 
a federal form of Government. It is usually assumed that what is 
commonly called the "responsible Ministry system" will work in 
Federation. I confess that I was of the same opinion myself in 1890 
when I wrote the Federation Manual, but in the second edition of 
that work, I acknowledged my error and admitted that Federation 
would either kill the " responsible Ministry system," or the responsible 
Ministry system would kill Federation. As everyone knows, that 
system has arisen in consequence of the predominant power of one 
branch of the Legislature—the House of Commons—in the British 
constitution.    It is unworkable with two Houses of co-equal powers. 
A responsible Ministry is not a necessary corollary to free political 
institutions or to Representative Government. It, is only an accidental 
result of Representative Government in Great Britain, and has never 
been adopted in a Federation (Canada, for reasons before stated, 
being excluded from consideration). 
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CONCLUSION. 
The foregoing articles have been written with the intention of 
placing before the electors of South Australia, in as plain and popular 
a form as possible, some of the leading facts and observations 
concerning this great and important question, and the writer hopes 
that he may not have been entirely unsuccessful in endeavoring to 
present to the public of South Australia Federation from his point of 
view. A subject can only be properly understood by regarding it 
from various aspects, and it is hoped that even those who do not agree 
with the ideas and conclusions of the writer may at least have derived 
some information and ground for thought. 
 
 
 
